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Abstract 
In this paper we use rich panel data for a representative sample of Estonian enterprises to analyse 
diverse issues related to the determinants of ownership structures and  ownership changes after 
privatisation. A key focus is to determine whether ownership changes are related to economic 
efficiency. While employee owned firms are found to be much more prone than other firms to 
switch ownership categories, often “employee owned” firms remain “insider-owned” as ownership 
passes from current employees to managers and former employees. Logit analyses of the 
determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes provides mixed support for several 
hypotheses. As predicted: (i) wealth and resource constraints play a crucial role in the 
determination of ownership, with foreigners buying firms with the highest equity levels and 
insiders buying firms with the lowest equity valuations; (ii) risk aversion explains subsequent 
ownership changes, especially away from employee ownership; (iii) allocation of ownership 
depends on the pre-privatisation origin and location of the firm, and these factors also influence 
subsequent ownership changes. Finally we compare our findings with those achieved by using 
more conventional approaches to analyze efficiency that use very similar data. Reassuringly the 
evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the view that efficiency considerations drive 
ownership changes (while earlier analysis for Estonia and for many other transition economies has 
identified the impact of ownership on economic performance.) However, the findings in this paper 
also establish that there are important influences besides economic efficiency that affect enterprise 
ownership and ownership changes. 
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I Introduction 
Since privatisation processes in Eastern Europe have resulted in the emergence of 
diverse ownership structures, an unprecedented opportunity to examine various issues concerning 
the nature and effects of different ownership configurations has been provided. One crucial area of 
inquiry that has received much attention is the comparative efficiency of differing ownership 
structures.  Moreover, research on transition economies in this area overwhelmingly has adopted 
methods that might be labelled “conventional approaches”, including the estimation of production 
functions that are augmented by various measures of ownership (as reviewed, for example, in 
Djankov and Murrell, 2002.) In this paper we take a different tack and instead focus on the nature 
and the determinants of ownership changes.  
We argue that approaching the issue in this alternative way has some benefits to 
using mainstream methods and that it produces findings that at least are complementary to the 
information derived from other approaches. Some of the reasons for approaching the issue this 
way reflect potential problems with using conventional approaches in transition economies. One 
argument is based on Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  Since firms are likely to adopt an ownership 
structure that minimises transaction costs for a given firm or industry, they claim that studies of 
the comparative efficiency of varying ownership structures may be biased. In other words, a test 
which regresses performance on ownership is not likely to find the true differences in comparative 
efficiency. Another important potential deficiency of traditional efficiency analysis reflects the 
extent of measurement error in key variables. As many have noted (e.g. Filer and Hanousek, 
2002), the accounting data for transition economies, especially during early transition, was often 
regarded as unreliable.  
The alternative approach is based on ownership dynamics and results from invoking 
the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960.) This recognizes that, since privatisation in all transition 
economies was a highly politicized process (e.g. Estrin, 1994; Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead, 
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1997), the initial ownership structures that emerged from this process were unlikely to be optimal 
from the economic point of view. However, in keeping with the Coase theorem, it was expected 
that freely tradable property rights would lead to resale of shares which, in turn, would produce 
efficiency-enhancing ownership changes (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). According to this 
view, one of the reasons why ownership markets are expected to select the most efficient 
ownership structures is because of the opportunities for mutually beneficial transactions-- more 
efficient owners (who, by definition are able to create more value) would buy shares from less 
efficient owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hansmann, 1996). 
Another reason is that product market competition would force high-cost enterprises out of the 
market. If the costs of ownership in a particular firm are high, in order to survive, such firms may 
be forced to sell equity to other investors. In other words, the direction of ownership changes 
should be highly informative concerning the advantages of different ownership forms. 
 Why different ownership structures emerge and change is also of interest for reasons 
other than a narrow focus on comparative efficiency. These broader concerns are of special note in 
transition economies where an astonishing feature has been the widespread emergence of insider, 
and notably employee, ownership (Estrin and Wright,1999; Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead, 
1997). Moreover, the transition from insider ownership to conventional ownership structures has 
been regarded as a prerequisite for strategic restructuring of enterprises (Aghion and Blanchard, 
1998).  Hence in this paper, of the diverse possible ownership transitions, we concentrate on issues 
surrounding insider vs. investor ownership. Our investigation examines several related matters 
including: the characteristics of firms that are changing from insider to outsider ownership; the 
determinants of these transitions; the nature of firms in which insider ownership is proving to be 
more durable; and whether broad-based employee ownership structures are able to persist or 
whether there concentration of ownership among managerial insiders must occur.1 The structure of 
the paper is as follows. 
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In the next section we briefly review the literature on the choice of ownership form, 
paying particular attention to issues concerning the adoption and the stability of insider ownership. 
Since some authors have expressed concerns that ownership dynamics may also be a biased 
indicator of economic efficiency, we also review these arguments in this section. To provide 
institutional context for our empirical analysis we then review key aspects of privatization in 
Estonia. Next we briefly describe our most unusual-- panel data for a large stratified random 
sample of Estonian firms. In addition we are able to combine economic and financial information 
with several waves of survey data from individual firms collected by the authors, including details 
of the evolution of firm ownership. In the following three sections we use these rich new data to 
examine a variety of hypotheses on the determinants of ownership structures and ownership 
changes. We estimate a variety of binary and multinomial logits and are able to test many 
hypotheses that have been unable to be examined in previous work because of limited data. Since 
the first year for which we have a cross-section of firm ownership is 1995, we begin by analyzing  
the determinants of these initial ownership structures in 1995. Importantly, in that process, we are 
able to use financial data starts for 1993, since that is the first year for which such information are 
available. Next we analyse ownership changes during the period 1995-1999. Finally, we estimate 
the determinants of ownership structures at the end of the period for which data are available, 
namely for 1999. In the concluding section, after summarizing our findings, we return to our 
original point of departure and compare the results in this paper with those achieved by using 
conventional approaches to analyze the same data. 
 
II Conceptual Framework 
 During recent years, several themes have appeared in the literature that relate to the 
incidence and stability of employee ownership vis-à-vis other ownership configurations. Dow 
(2003) has nicely captured the major considerations emerging from some of this work concerning 
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the relative advantage of employee ownership in the phrase “incentive optimism vs. finance 
pessimism”2  Even though insider ownership promises to align the incentives of insiders with 
company performance and should be preferred if judged solely by incentives, for reasons of risk 
diversification it is deemed better to delegate ownership to risk neutral investors. For this reason, 
one expects to see less insider ownership in firms and industries where the required equity input 
and investment requirements are high. This line of reasoning also implies that insiders would be 
expected to be owners in firms and industries where business is more stable. However, against 
this, it can be argued that control of the company might be especially valuable in volatile 
industries, where the likelihood of losing one’s job is higher. In such circumstances, insider 
ownership provides an insurance effect and control of the company lowers the probability of 
insiders losing their jobs and their investment in firm-specific human capital. Arguably this 
consideration is especially relevant in firms owned by managers, since managers have often a lot 
to lose if they are fired. The gap between current income and outside opportunities is especially 
large for “red” managers who have inherited their positions from socialist times (Aghion and 
Blanchard, 1998; Filatochev, Wright and Bleaney, 1999).  
 The incentive effect can also depend on the size of the workforce. Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) argued that increases in the workforce dilute the impact of group incentive 
schemes. According to this argument, when the size of the workforce increases, employees would 
benefit from delegating ownership to a central monitor. In other words, higher employment levels  
favour managerial ownership over employee ownership, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, Hansmann’s 
(1996) argument that the costs of collective decision-making increase with the size of employees 
also suggests that employee ownership should be negatively related to the size of the workforce. 
 As well as greater risk aversion, wealth constraints may lead to insiders having time 
preferences that favour current consumption over risky future consumption. Other things equal, 
this leads insiders to favour firms with reliable income flows and high profits. By contrast, 
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investors are expected to take a longer-term view and forego current profits in the expectation of 
higher profits in the future. Therefore insider ownership should be more prevalent in firms with 
higher profits.3 
 Turning to ownership changes, so far as the movement from insider to outsider 
ownership is concerned, a key focus in the literature is the role of strong economic performance. 
According to some literature on employee ownership, especially successful employee-owned firms 
are often more likely to convert into conventional ownership structures (e.g. Miyazaki, 1984). This 
result emerges because departing employees are more likely to get a good return by selling shares 
to outside investors than by selling them internally. In turn, outsider owners are more likely to be 
interested in firms with a proven performance record. On the other hand, poorly performing firms 
may have to turn to investors out of necessity-- in order to survive. The effect of performance on 
ownership is thus ambiguous.  
 Economic performance is also thought to play a crucial role in triggering ownership 
changes from investor to insider ownership. Thus employee buy-outs are known to be a device of 
saving failing firms by making downward wage adjustments possible (Ben-Ner and Yun, 1996). In 
turn, management buy-outs often occur to solve agency problems between managers and owners, 
and / or when the managers observe entrepreneurial opportunities that existing owners do not 
realise (e.g. Wright et al., 2001). Management buy-outs are likely to happen when share prices are 
lower than the management’s subjective valuation of the firm Thus we tentatively hypothesize that 
employee buy-outs are related to underperformance, and management buy-outs are related to 
undervaluation of shares.4 On the other hand, considerations of risk and time preferences also 
apply and perhaps prevent some otherwise efficient transitions from investor to insider ownership. 
 However it should also be noted that the block holder argument of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) applies to both types of ownership change. That is, the more shares a minority 
owner holds in a given firm, the less costly it is to for that minority owner to take over the 
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company. Thus higher minority ownership stakes should facilitate take-overs irrespective of the 
direction of the ownership switch.  
 Finally, we consider two arguments that cast doubt on the efficiency of market 
selection processes, though with rather different implications. First, even though there is empirical 
evidence that employee ownership, combined with participation in decision-making, improves 
economic performance (e.g. Doucouligos, 1995; Kruse and Blasi, 1997), as an organisational form 
it remains rare. To explain this phenomenon, some point to various factors including: limited 
returns from innovation to individual employee-owners which lead to limited entry of employee-
owned firms; to difficulties in setting up markets for shares in employee-owned firms; and to 
employee wealth constraints and aversion to risk (Ben-Ner, 1988; Dow, 2003). Thus these 
arguments predict that employee ownership is selected far less often than is optimal. However, in 
transition economies the circumstances were extraordinarily favourable to the formation of 
employee-owned firms. The privatisation processes often favoured insiders, e.g. in the form of 
under priced equity, so that entry barriers were unusually low. However, the underdevelopment of 
capital markets in transition economies has several negative implications for the entry and stability 
of employee ownership (Mygind, 2001). During early transition in general bank loans were not 
available for employees to finance the buy-out of initial equity. Hence, often it was difficult for 
employees to make the necessary investment, even if the purchasing price was rather low.5 
Moreover, liquidity constraints and lack of credit may cause employees to sell their shares 
whenever possible. In other words, during early transition imperfect credit markets were expected 
to work in favour of wealthier investors, especially foreigners, and the elite of domestic investors 
and managers. 
Furthermore, the absence of functioning markets for shares may cause other 
problems, notably the exclusion of new employees from ownership, which in turn leads to 
increases in ownership by former employees and concentration of ownership amongst managers. 
 8 
While such developments have been observed, it should be noted that these do not represent 
changes from insider to outsider ownership, but rather changes in the composition of insider 
owners.6  
 Aghion and Blanchard (1998) make a diametrically opposite claim. They argue that 
insiders are crucially concerned about job security and thus they sell to outsiders less often than 
would be optimal.  
In sum, the early literature raises several issues concerning the efficiency of the 
selection process.7 While some of these influences favour outsider ownership, others point in the 
opposite direction. Consequently, questions such as whether the net bias is stronger in one 
direction or another and whether particular groups of insider and outsider owners are influenced 
by issues unrelated to efficiency remain unresolved.8 We return to these issues in the concluding 
section. 
 
III Privatisation in Estonia  
Privatisation in Estonia took place in three distinct stages.9 The first stage was 
connected to Gorbachev’s reform attempts in the Soviet Union after 1986. Related to Gorbachev’s 
perestroika programme, several hundred co-operatives were established in Estonia. A related 
development was the establishment of small state enterprises that nominally remained in state 
ownership and existed in a symbiotic relationship with state enterprises, but where employees had 
control over production, investment, wages, product prices, and distribution of profits. Co-
operatives were privately owned from the start, so they were excluded from the privatisation 
programmes, and were the earliest employee-owned enterprises in Estonia. Typically small state 
enterprises were privatised later to their employees. Another important programme starting from 
1987 was the possibility of establishing joint ventures with foreign partners. Later on these firms 
were taken over mostly by foreigners.  
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The last effort of the Soviet authorities to speed up privatisation in Estonia was the 
industrial leasing programme whereby the workforce collectively leased the assets from the state 
for an agreed fee, and in return gained rights to control and to receive revenues. While the 
programme was of little importance in Estonia (only 12 enterprises were privatised under this 
programme), it did serve as a model for the Estonian leasing programmes that were introduced 
between 1990-92 and which proved to be a major source of employee ownership in Estonia. The 
establishment of new private companies became legal in late 1989 and the small privatisation 
programme was launched in late 1990. These programmes created a vibrant entrepreneurial sector 
in Estonia, where widespread involvement of foreigners was a special characteristic (Liuhto, 1995, 
1996).  
Privatisation of the collective sector was also an important development. During the 
socialist era Estonia had a large consumer co-operative sector, as well as collective and state 
farms, rural construction associations, and rural machinery associations. Typically the assets of 
collective and state farms were privatised to their employees (excluding land). However, consumer 
and supply co-operatives remained in the hands of their members (though some related firms 
became daughter companies of central co-operatives). The property of construction and machinery 
associations was transferred to private firms (often formed by former employees). Thus, in these 
ways, privatisation of the collective sector led to the formation of both outsider ownership and 
employee ownership.10  
The centralised privatisation programme started with the establishment of the 
Estonian Privatisation Enterprise (EPE) in September 1992, followed by the introduction of a law 
on privatisation in June 1993, and the establishment of the Estonian Privatisation Agency (EPA, 
the successor of EPE) in September 1993. This development led to preferences for privatisation 
through tenders to strategic investors and for large concentrated investors rather than insiders or 
dispersed investors. It should be noted that our sample includes only companies that were private 
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by 1st of January 1995, and thus excludes a substantial number of firms that were privatised in the 
centralised privatisation programme (especially in 1995-1997). For this reason, our data somewhat 
exaggerate the importance of insider privatisation. However, since many other researchers have 
focused exclusively on the centralised privatisation programmes (e.g. Terk, 2000), our work serves 
as a useful reminder on the diversity of Estonian privatisation processes and the resulting 
ownership structures that often have been overlooked. 
 
IV Data and Summary Statistics on Ownership Changes 
Our data are for a panel of Estonian firms. The panel is derived from a representative 
sample of 500 enterprises, stratified by size and industry, which were private in 1995. For these 
firms we merge data from a number of sources but mainly by combining fresh ownership 
information for 1995-1999 that were collected from new surveys, with accounting data from 1993-
1998.11   Of the original 500 firms, 409 (82%) cooperated in an initial special survey undertaken in 
1995 and designed by the authors to provide additional data especially on ownership. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the number of shares held by different groups both currently (in fact on 
January 1st 1995) as well as at the time of privatisation. Subsequent ownership surveys were 
administered annually with the last survey in1999. These ownership data were then matched with 
economic and financial data for corresponding firms, as well as with information on firm origin 
(privatised, former collective, new, or former joint venture). Further reductions in sample size 
resulted from excluding the smallest firms (with fewer than 10 employees in 1995) from the 
analysis. 
Table 1 shows the association between ownership at the time of privatisation and the 
origin of the firm.  Ownership groups are determined according to the widely used “dominant 
owners” approach, where the firm is assigned to the ownership group holding more shares than 
any other group. As the table indicates, the history of a firm clearly affects to whom the firm is 
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privatised. Of state-owned firms privatised before 1995, employees had taken over more firms 
than had any other groups (38), closely followed by domestic investors (33) and managers (26). At 
this stage foreign involvement in privatisation was clearly less significant than that of domestic 
players. Thus domestic investors and employees had taken the largest share of privatized firms that 
formerly were collective firms, including former consumer co-operatives, rural construction 
associations, and collective and state firms. Typically firms emerging from the consumer co-
operative sector or construction association were owned by domestic investors (either members of 
co-operatives or by central co-operatives) and the successor firms of collective and state farms 
were taken over by their employees. Almost all joint ventures were taken over by the foreign 
partner, and new firms were mainly set up by managers or by foreigners. 
Table 2 presents ownership changes between January 1st 1995, which is the earliest 
time for which we have ownership data, and January 1st 1999. Importantly, a new group, namely 
former employees, has entered the picture. Table 2 reveals that there are many individuals who 
owned shares in their company when they were employed, and who have kept their shares after 
ceasing employment. This suggests that there is a limited market for shares. Note also that there is 
considerable attrition-- around one-third of firms drop from the panel, either because the firm is 
liquidated or because the respondent does not want to answer to the questions in successive 
rounds.12  
It is also clear from Table 2 that employee ownership is diminishing rapidly. During 
1995-1999, the number of employee-owned firms fell from 46 to 19. Note also that 12 of these 
firms  were also employee-owned at the start of the period. In contrast, there has been a sharp 
increase in managerially-owned firms (from 65 to 87). Ownership by foreigners and domestic 
outsiders has remained relatively stable, while firms  owned by former employees have increased 
from 5 to 15. However, it can be seen that most changes among insider-owned companies happen 
internally: the relative positions of insider ownership and outsider ownership remain virtually 
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unchanged. In fact, the number of insider-owned firms increased by 5, from 116 to 121. This 
development does not support the hypothesis that insider ownership would be declining rapidly, 
and it appears more supportive to the Aghion and Blanchard (1998) hypothesis that insider 
ownership is relatively stable.  
 
V Determinants of Initial Ownership Structures 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for variables that are used in the empirical 
analysis of the determinants of initial ownership structures (see the appendix for variable 
definitions.) Equity capital per employee (EQEMPL93) is designed to capture financing 
constraints. Since the privatisation price typically determines the nominal capital of the firm, this 
is a good proxy for equity investment requirements. However, for new firms, the interpretation is 
somewhat different and, in this case, nominal capital is also likely to reflect owners’ investments 
in firm equity.  Capital intensity (CAPINTENS93) is a proxy for the investment requirements of 
the enterprise and higher values of capital intensity are expected to lead to higher investment. 
Earlier literature on the incidence of employee ownership in developed economies has also 
related this variable to work organisation, although in conflicting ways. Thus Jones and Kato 
(1993) assume that higher capital intensity means more machine-paced production and less 
worker discretion and hence less need for share schemes. On the other hand, Kruse (1996) 
interprets higher capital intensity as requiring higher worker effort and an increased need for 
share schemes. Since both studies find evidence to support their hypotheses, this issue remains 
ambiguous. However, since in a previous study for Estonia (Jones and Mygind, 1999) it was 
found that higher capital intensity was negatively related to the incidence of insider ownership, 
we predict that the incidence of insider ownership is negatively related to capital intensity or 
equity investment. The number of employees (EMPLOY93) is related to the free-rider and 
collective decision-making problems, and is thought to be negatively related to employee 
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ownership. Ceteris paribus, firms with higher profit-margins (PROFITMARGIN93) are believed 
more likely to be insider owned (because of insiders’ preferences for current consumption). An 
alternative performance measure is productivity (PRODUCTIV93). If insiders are able to select 
the best firms (e.g. Frydman et al., 1999) productivity is expected to be positively related to 
insider ownership. In addition, we include controls for location, industry, and origin and also a 
variable that examines the importance of the time of privatisation13. 
   One thing that is apparent from Table 3 is that the hypothesis that employee-
owned firms would be smaller than other firms does not hold for this sample. If anything, 
employee-owned firms are bigger than firms with other ownership structures. The mean of 
employment for employee-owned firms is 175 employees, while it is 112 employees for all firms. 
For two categories, namely foreign-owned and managerially-owned firms,  the average number of 
employees is clearly smaller than in other groups. However, this is partly because the proportion 
of new firms (that are smaller than privatised firms) is larger in these two ownership categories. 
Turning to performance measures, we see that productivity (measured by output per employee) is 
clearly higher for foreign-owned firms than for other firms.14 However, the situation regarding 
profits is quite different. Employee-owned firms have the highest profit margin and foreign-
owned firms the lowest. Examining capital intensity and nominal equity capital per employee, 
again there are clear differences between firms. These variables are both much higher in foreign-
owned firms than in other firms, and there is also quite a difference between domestic investor-
owned firms and insider-owned firms. Since nominal capital often reflects the privatisation price, 
this suggests that outsiders have had to pay much more than insiders for assets.15 There are 
various explanations for this phenomenon. It may indicate that insider-owned firms are more 
constrained than others, either by the limited wealth of their owners or by the more restricted 
availability of credit for insiders. An alternative explanation is that the assets of these firms were 
assigned a lower value than the assets in firms sold to outsiders, and thereby insiders were (at 
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least implicitly, if not explicitly) given preference in the privatisation process. A third alternative 
is that there were fewer assets per employees in insider-owned firms (they were less capital 
intensive) or the assets were of poorer quality. We address these issues in our econometric 
analysis.  
 Over 70% of foreign-owned firms in the sample are located in the five largest 
Estonian cities, while only 45% of employee-owned firms and 33% of firms owned by former 
employees are based in these towns. More than 50% of employee-owned firms in the sample are 
former state-owned firms, while only 10% of foreign-owned firms are former state firms. Of 
foreign firms, more than half are newly-established, while only a quarter of employee-owned 
firms are new. Managerially-owned firms are most commonly new firms: 68 % of managerially-
owned firms are new. Finally, among domestically-owned firms, the largest group comprises 
former collectives and joint ventures. This is because of the large number of firms from the 
former co-operative sector that are now classified as domestically-owned. There are no 
pronounced differences in privatisation time across firms in the different ownership categories. 
 Table 4 presents the results from a simple logit analysis of the determinants of initial 
ownership by insiders. The first column gives the raw logit parameter coefficients together with 
standard errors and significance levels, while the second column gives the marginal probability 
effects for statistically significant coefficients. An important finding is that equity investment 
(EQEMPL93) is statistically significantly lower in firms owned by insiders. 16 Moreover, the 
parameter coefficient is very high: doubling the equity investment reduces the probability that the 
firm is owned by insiders by around 5 percentage points (from the baseline probability of 37%). 
This supports the contention that insiders have made a smaller investment in share capital. Since 
we also control for capital intensity, it appears that insiders have paid a lower price for the same 
amount of capital. This suggests that shares in insider-owned firms have possibly been 
undervalued. The sign of the capital intensity coefficient is negative, but insignificant.17 
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Unsurprisingly in view of the findings contained in the summary statistics presented 
in Table 3, we also find that the two origin dummies are also significant. The conditional 
probability of a new firm being insider-owned is 72 % and, for a formerly state-owned firm,  it is 
69%. Moreover, insider-owned firms are more often located outside the largest cities. Location in 
town reduces the probability of observing insider ownership by around 15 percentage points. 
 One especially interesting finding is that insiders appear to have bought firms with 
lower productivity. Increasing productivity by 100% reduces the probability of observing insider 
ownership by around 6 percentage points. This runs counter to some earlier results for other 
transition economies that insiders are able to select the best firms (Frydman et al., 1999). 
However, since productivity is from the year 1993 (and not always immediately after 
privatisation), we cannot be sure that there is not a reverse causality effect. Outsiders may have 
been able to improve the performance of firms so much that the difference in productivity has 
become significant. The second measure for firm quality, profitability has a positive sign, although 
it is statistically insignificant. Other variables are not statistically significant, including all the 
industry dummies and privatisation year. It is notable that, contrary to expectations, the parameter 
coefficient for employment is positive although it is insignificant.  
 Additional insights concerning the determinants of initial ownership structures may 
emerge from estimating multinomial models. In these estimates, outsider-owned firms are divided 
into foreign- and domestically-owned firms, while insider-owned firms are divided into manager- 
and employee-owned firms. (The nine firms that were owned by former employees, were assigned 
to their initial ownership groups, 7 to employee ownership and 2 to managerial ownership). 
Findings from multinomial estimates are reported in Table 5. The three first columns in Table 5 
contrast employee-owned firms with other ownership types. The results suggest that the impact of 
the explanatory variables is highest when employee-owned firms are contrasted with foreign-
owned firms (first column). There are considerable differences in productivity, equity investment 
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and profitability, all at the 1 % level of statistical significance. Employee-owned firms have lower 
productivity and equity investments than do foreign-owned firms, but they are more profitable. 
Employee-owned firms are also found to be less capital-intensive, are more often located in the 
countryside and, compared to foreign-owned firms, they have more employees. 
 When employee-owned firms are contrasted with domestic outsider-owned firms, 
again the most significant predictor of ownership structure is equity investment. Domestic 
outsiders have made considerably larger equity investments in their firms than have employees in 
their firms. However, employee-owned firms are more profitable, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5 % level. If the firm is a former state firm or a new firm, rather than a firm from 
the collective sector, it is more likely to be owned by employees. Firms located in the countryside 
are more likely to be owned by employees, and firms with higher productivity are more likely to 
be owned by domestic outsiders than are employees. There are also differences between 
employee-owned firms and managerially-owned firms, especially in employment (larger firms are 
employee-owned) and profits (the more profitable firms are employee-owned). Also, new firms 
are more likely to be owned by managers. 
 The next three columns contrast the determinants of ownership structures for firms in 
which dominant owners are foreigners or managers, domestic investors or managers, and 
foreigners or domestic investors respectively. The results indicate that higher productivity, capital 
intensity, and equity capital predict foreign rather than managerial ownership. As such the results 
are not that different from the comparisons discussed above, i.e. for firms in which dominant 
owners are either foreigners or employees. The multinomial estimates also indicate that 
privatisation time is also significant, suggesting that the later a firm is privatised, the more likely it 
is to be in foreign rather than in managerial ownership. This indicates that managers (or, more 
generally, insiders) were better positioned to seize the early opportunities produced by 
privatisation than were foreigners. There are fewer differences between the determinants of initial 
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ownership for firms owned by domestic investors and managers, though a higher level of equity 
capital is found to predict investor rather than managerial ownership. Urban location also increases 
the probability of investor rather than managerial ownership. Finally, it is interesting to find that 
higher productivity, capital intensity and equity capital predict foreign rather than domestic 
investor ownership. Hence foreign ownership is rather distinct in these respects. However, a 
higher level of employment is found to predict domestic investor ownership rather than foreign 
ownership. In addition, the origin dummies are often statistically significant, again highlighting the 
role of different privatisation programmes in the emergence of initial ownership configurations.   
 In sum, findings based on both the simple logit and the multinomial results 
concerning factors influencing ownership structures do not support the hypothesis that the 
determinants of initial (post privatization) ownership structures were completely random. Several 
forces are consistently found to play important roles in these processes.  Thus equity investment 
is always found to be clearly lower in insider-owned firms. This may reflect the fact that insiders 
were unable to buy firms with high capital requirements; on the other hand, it may mean that 
insiders were favoured in the privatisation process and were able to buy the firms cheaper. The 
effect of lower equity investment extends also to new firms, meaning that firms started up by 
outsider investors are much better capitalised than those that are run by manager-owners or 
groups of employees. Since outsider-owned new firms in our sample are usually owned by 
foreigners, an interpretation of this finding based on wealth constraints is very plausible. 
Moreover, we find that the origin and location of the firm are clearly related to the initial 
assignment of insider and outsider ownership. 
 
VI The Determinants of Ownership Changes  
 In the previous section several factors that bear on the determination of initial 
ownership structures were identified. While some of these variables are linked with  economic 
 18 
efficiency concerns, such considerations clearly did not drive the whole process. Therefore, it is 
important to carefully examine  ownership changes, to see what motivates subsequent ownership 
changes. Hence, in this section, we examine ownership changes. Consistent with our earlier 
discussion, we focus on transitions from insider to outsider ownership, and vice versa.  
As background for the logit analysis, in Table 6 we show ownership changes for 
each year.18  In 1995, six firms moved from outsider to insider ownership, while only one firm 
moved from insider to outsider ownership. After that, there hve been the same number of changes 
in either direction. Most of the changes took place in 1996 and 1998. In both of these years, eight 
firms moved in each direction.19  
 We use many of the same variables for modelling ownership changes  that were 
used when modelling ownership structures. However, in addition we are able to use information 
on time-variant characteristics of firms including annual growth rates for sales, capital stock, 
capital intensity and productivity, as well as  averages for profit margins and sales volatility. In 
order to better identify the impact on ownership changes, we measure these variables only prior to 
ownership change. 20 
 Table 7 presents the means for these time-dependent variables, and also for minority 
ownership in 1995 (for outsider-owned firms the amount of insider ownership, and for insider-
owned firms the amount of outsider ownership), according to firm ownership in 1995. Foreign-
owned firms are clearly growing fastest, both in terms of employment and sales. Surprisingly, 
perhaps, foreign-owned firms have experienced a slower growth of capital stock than firms 
owned by domestic investors or managers, and their productivity growth is lower than that of any 
other group.21 Foreign-owned firms are also least profitable and, on average, are becoming more 
labour-intensive. Their sales volatility is also the highest. Firms owned by domestic investors and 
managers are behaving in quite similar ways. Firms in both groups were investing quite heavily 
and growing moderately. Employment remains stable in manager-owned firms, while domestic-
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owned firms are shrinking, although not as much as in employee-owned firms in which 
employment decreases by almost 10 % annually. Sales in employee-owned firms are also 
shrinking, but they are the most profitable of all firms (though not by a great deal), and their sales 
volatility is clearly lower than that of other groups. When levels of minority ownership are 
examined, it appears that minority ownership in insider-owned firms is very low, while in 
outsider-owned firms it is of moderate importance, especially in firms owned by domestic 
outsiders. In these firms, insider ownership more often assumes the form of managerial, rather 
than employee ownership. 
 To evaluate the determinants of ownership change, firms are divided into two 
groups—those that were initially classified as insider owned, and those that were initially 
categorized as outsider owned. In analyzing the determinants of the change from insider to 
outsider ownership we have information for 112 firms in our sample that begin as insider owned. 
While in the main, the variables that are used are very similar to those used in earlier empirical 
work, there are some modest changes. 22 
 Findings for two alternative specifications are reported in Table 8. While in the first 
estimate we use sales growth and investment, in the second specification these are replaced by the 
growth in productivity, capital intensity and employment. Alternative specifications are employed 
because employment growth is heavily correlated with sales growth and investment and, if we 
wish to estimate the impact of employment growth on ownership changes, then it may be better to 
use per capita indicators for remaining variables. However, the results reported in Table 8 indicate 
that parameter coefficients remain very stable across both specifications. Also, in both cases, the 
likelihood ratio indicates that the hypothesis of joint insignificance of all variables must be 
rejected. Since the likelihood ratio is slightly higher in specification 1 (and there is one more 
significant coefficient  than in specification 2) we therefore focus our comments on the first 
specification. 
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 Our results indicate that ownership change is positively related to the number of 
employees, initial productivity, and new firm status, while there is a negative relationship with 
sales volatility, sales growth and initial managerial ownership. However, the precise interpretation 
to place on the findings is sometimes unclear. Thus the finding that outsiders take over firms that 
have more employees is as expected.23  Together with a negative coefficient for employment 
growth, this suggests that outsiders take over large firms with falling employment, which arguably 
gives support to the notion that outsiders take over somewhat problematic firms.  However, the 
effect of performance on ownership change remains unclear. While the positive and significant 
parameter coefficient for initial productivity suggests that outsiders take over better firms, the 
coefficient for sales growth is negative and significant. In addition, the coefficients for 
productivity growth and profitability are negative, though insignificant.  
The coefficient on sales volatility is negative and statistically significant which, 
contrary to expectations, suggests that outsiders take over less risky firms. Alternatively, this 
finding may lend support to the hypothesis that insider control is more valuable in volatile firms. 
One reason for this is that employee-owned firms that have lower sales volatility were especially 
likely to be taken over by outsiders. Furthermore, additional unreported analysis of the data 
reveals that the coefficient of variation for sales was not different between firms that were 
employee-owned in 1998 and firms that became outsider-owned, while a t-test indicated that it 
was statistically significantly higher in managerially-owned firms compared to the rest of the 
sample. This suggests that high volatility is typical for firms that have remained or have become 
managerially-owned. As such this squares quite nicely with the Aghion-Blanchard (1998) 
argument that control in transition economies is especially valuable for managers.  
The results also indicate that the status of being a new firm significantly raises the 
chance of the firm being taken over by outsiders. One interpretation for this finding is that in 
former state firms and collective firms, even weak traditions of insider control may have produced  
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barriers to ownership changes. By contrast, the founders of new firms may always have had the 
explicit aim of selling their firm after a few years of operations. Alternatively, it may be that 
outsiders regard new firms as more lucrative investments than old firms. The existence of 
differences in ownership dynamics between employee- and managerially-owned firms and firm 
origins is also revealed by the following facts. Initially, there were 40 new firms in the sample that 
were under dominant managerial ownership. Only 3 of them (7.5%) changed to outsider 
ownership. But of the 11 new firms initially in employee ownership, 7 (63.6 %) moved to outsider 
ownership. By contrast, of 35 privatised firms that were initially majority-owned by employees, 
only 7 (20 %) moved to outsider ownership, while the corresponding figure for privatised 
managerially-owned firms was 3 of 25 (12 %). This interesting finding shows that it is the 
combination of initial employee ownership and de novo status that renders the firm especially 
likely to move to outsider ownership, rather than either of these variables in isolation. Many of the 
new, employee-owned firms are likely to be co-operatives established in the late 1980s that had a 
strongly managerial character from the beginning. 
 The last column gives the marginal effects on the basis of specification 1 in table 8. 
The baseline probability is calculated for a former collective firm that is initially employee-owned, 
and all other relevant variables are calculated at sample means. The baseline probability of an 
ownership change for such a firm is very small, only 1.5%. However, for managerially-owned 
firms, the probability is calculated to be only a quarter of that rate, namely 0.4%. When 
employment is doubled, the probability rises to around 10%, whereas when initial productivity is 
doubled, the probability is around 5%. However, a 10 percentage point increase in the annual 
growth rate of sales would decrease the probability of an ownership change by about a third, to 
1%. A 100% increase in the variance of sales would decrease the probability by around 50%. The 
most dramatic effect results from the status of being a new firm. Our findings indicate that if the 
firm is new (rather than being a former collective), the probability of ownership change increases 
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by 37 percentage points, or by more than 25 times. For a new firm under employee ownership, the 
expected probability of ownership change is a little over 38 %, while the observed probability was 
around 60 %. 
 We now turn to modelling the change from outsider to insider ownership. 
Essentially we employ specifications that are similar to those used in analysing the change from 
insider to outsider ownership. However, in this case we introduce new variables to capture the 
picture concerning foreign dominant ownership and minority insider ownership in 1995. Again 
two specifications are estimated. Findings are reported in Table 9.  
One of the variables that is statistically significant in predicting the change from 
outsider to insider ownership is the size of the initial minority stake.24 Insider takeovers are also 
related to the initial equity stake of insiders. These findings, that point to the importance of lower 
initial equity investments and the size of the initial minority stake for insider takeovers, are 
consistent with theoretical expectations. Thus Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stress that the more 
shares the buyer owns in advance the more this reduces the costs of the takeover. Moreover, the 
initial equity investment is likely to influence the later trading price of shares25, so lower equity 
investment also lowers the cost of takeover. The two variables also seem to be interrelated: the 
mean (and standard deviation) of log of share capital per employee is 9.84 (2.35) for firms with 
less than 10% minority insider ownership, while it is 8.21 (1.89) for firms with at least 10% 
insider ownership. This difference in means is significant at the 1% level. This indicates again that 
raising equity may be a substantial deterrent to insider ownership. 
Sales volatility is also significantly related to the adoption of insider ownership; 
moreover, as expected, insiders take over less volatile firms. Given the initial equity investment, 
insiders also seem to take over firms with higher capital intensity, which apparently is contrary to 
predictions. There is no discernible evidence that firm quality, employment or employment 
changes affect the likelihood of the adoption of insider ownership. In particular, we do not find 
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support for the hypothesis that switches into insider ownership would be driven by relative 
underperformance. Neither is there evidence that investment, origin of the firm, location or 
privatisation time influence an ownership change. 
 The rightmost column of table 9 presents the marginal effects that are based on these 
estimates. The baseline probability for an ownership change that is calculated for a domestically 
owned firm from the collective sector, is around 14.5%. A 100% increase in capital intensity 
would increase the probability of an insider takeover by around 6 percentage points. In turn, 
increasing equity investment by 100% would decrease the probability of an insider takeover by 4 
percentage points, while a 100% increase in sales volatility would decrease the probability of 
insider takeover by 3 percentage points. A 10 % increase in initial minority insider ownership is 
calculated to increase the probability of an ownership change by 8 percentage points. 
 Taken  together, the results indicate that, as hypothesized,  outsiders take over larger 
insider-owned firms. However, this result may also reflect the fact that larger firms tended to be 
employee-owned and more vulnerable to take-overs than managerially-owned firms. However, 
when undertaking a similar analysis of ownership changes, though restricting this to only 
employee-owned companies, we also found that larger employee-owned firms were more 
vulnerable to take-overs.  
Our findings also point to significant effects flowing from risk (volatility), but the 
effects are not consistent. Thus for firms that are initially insider-owned, we find that outsiders are 
more likely to take over less risky firms. But among firms that are initially owned by outsiders, 
insiders also take over less risky firms. It is, of course, possible that a high volatility of sales 
reduces the demand for control in such firms, ceteris paribus. Also, the result that insiders retain 
ownership in riskier firms may point out that managerial control may be especially valuable in 
riskier firms. 
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 The results concerning the effects of performance, capital intensity or investment 
were mainly insignificant and yield no clear patterns. However, the empirical work also indicates 
that other variables are important. Outsider takeovers are much more common in newly-
established firms than in privatised firms or in firms from the former collective sector. A closer 
examination revealed that the new firms that changed ownership were mainly employee-owned 
initially, rather than firms that were managerially-owned. In turn, insider takeovers were related to 
the initial minority stake of insiders and to low equity investments. These factors reduce the 
capital requirements for a takeover. Since insiders are likely to be liquidity constrained, it is not 
surprising that these two variables exercise such an influence concerning insider takeovers. 
 
VII The Determinants of Ownership structures in 1999 
 In this section, we conclude our empirical work by analysing the determinants of 
ownership at the end of the period for which data are available, i.e. in 1999. A strategy similar to 
that reported earlier in the analysis of initial ownership structures is used. The first step is to report 
findings from a binomial logit analysis for the two broadest ownership groups, insiders and 
outsiders. Next, we analyse the determinants of ownership within a multinomial logit framework 
and use five groups (foreigners, domestic investors, managers, employees, former employees). 
Finally these results are compared to the results concerning initial ownership structures. 
 Table 10 presents the summary statistics for selected variables in 1998. An important 
difference between the variables in this section and those reported earlier is that here the time-
dependent covariates are measured throughout the period 1993-1998 for all firms, while 
previously they were measured only up to the time of the ownership change. This difference in 
measures reflects the shift in focus—away from factors influencing initial ownership structures, 
towards ownership structures at the end of the period. 
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It is especially interesting to compare these summary statistics with those presented 
in table 3 for 1995. No longer are employee-owned firms larger than other firms. However, similar 
differences prevail concerning capital-intensity and productivity. Also equity capital per employee 
is much lower in insider-owned firms, and employee-owned firms continue to be most profitable. 
Sales volatility is clearly lowest in employee-owned firms and those owned by former employees 
while sales growth is fastest in firms that are majority-owned by foreigners. The proportion of 
employee-owned firms in towns is much reduced, and the proportion of employee-owned firms 
that are new firms also has decreased drastically, from 25% to 5%. In contrast, the proportion of 
the successors of collective farms has increased from a little over 20 % to almost 50% (this is the 
residual after subtracting the frequencies for former state-owned and new firms). Moreover, the 
proportion of employee-owned firms in manufacturing has increased from slightly over 30% to 
over 50%. This suggests that among employee-owned firms, the most resilient are those that are 
successors of collective farms, operate in agriculture, and are located in rural areas. This supports 
the view of Earle and Estrin (1996) that employee-owned firms bring benefits to depressed areas 
and industries, and / or nobody else other than employees is interested in these firms.  
Table 11 presents the results of the binary logit analysis. As before, we use two 
different specifications. In the first we include sales growth and investment, while the other 
includes growth in employment, productivity and capital intensity. The new results make for 
interesting findings compared to those reported in table 4, concerning the determinants of initial 
ownership structures in 1995. While both productivity and location had statistically discernible 
impacts on initial ownership, by 1999 neither is a significant predictor of ownership. However, 
equity investment is an important determinant both of initial ownership structures as well as of 
ownership at the end of the period.  Also, insider ownership has remained much more common in 
firms that were formerly state-owned and in new firms, compared to firms that have arisen from 
the former collective sector. Interestingly, privatisation time is also now statistically significant 
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with the negative parameter coefficient indicating that firms privatised earlier are more often 
owned by insiders than are firms that were privatised later. Also, the findings from specification 2 
in table 11 suggest that increases in employment during 1993-1998 are positively related to insider 
ownership, though this result is significant only at a 10% level.  
 The rightmost column in Table 11 presents the marginal effects, calculated from 
specification 1. The baseline probability is calculated for a firm from the former collective sector 
located in the countryside and the probability of such a firm being majority owned by insiders is 
almost the same as in 1995, around 38%. This is not surprising, since the relative frequency of 
insider-owned firms has remained stable. It is interesting to compare the marginal effects from 
table 11 to those reported in table 4. For instance, the impact of equity investment is even bigger in 
1999 than in 1995 with a 100 % increase in equity investment per employee now decreasing the 
probability of insider ownership by over 8 percentage points, or over 20 %. As in table 4, the 
dummy variables have a strong impact on the probabilities. If the firm is a former state-owned 
firm or a new firm, it is more likely that it is owned by insiders than by outsiders. For a former 
state firm the probability of being insider owned is 66 % (representing 28 percentage points 
increase in the probability), and for new firms it is 57 % (18 percentage points increase). If 
privatisation time is increased by one year, then the probability of insider ownership decreases by 
6.7 % points. 
 In the previous multinomial analysis of initial ownership structures, we were able to 
use three comparison groups for employee ownership. By contrast, for 1999, we are also able to 
include former employees as an additional category. However, since it turns out that the results are 
quite similar to those for employee-owned companies, for this reason as well as space 
considerations, we choose to omit reporting these comparisons.26  
In Table 12 we report the results of the new multinomial analysis. The analysis of 
initial ownership structures reveals several differences. From Table 12 we see that some of the 
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differences between employee-owned and outsider-owned firms that were identified in the 
analysis of initial ownership configurations have remained. At the same time, the new results 
indicate that some of these differences have disappeared. One persistent finding is that, despite the 
many changes away from employee ownership, in both years employee ownership remains quite 
distinct from other companies. Somewhat surprisingly, in 1999 higher capital intensity predicts 
employee ownership rather than any other ownership structure; in addition, the difference with 
foreign ownership is statistically significant. This is surprising given that it appears that foreign-
owned firms are more capital-intensive than employee-owned firms (Table 10).27 As before higher 
equity capital consistently increases the odds for outsider rather than insider ownership. What is 
more, the differences seem to have become more pronounced over time. Lower sales volatility and 
higher profitability consistently increase the odds for employee ownership. Both of these findings 
are consistent with the hypotheses outlined earlier, namely that employees prefer to be owners in 
less volatile firms (or industries) and, other things equal, that they put heavy weight on the 
profitability of the firm. Higher productivity increases the probability of foreign ownership. 
Privatisation time is significant in the comparison between firms that are majority owned by 
managers and employees. This is consistent with the fact that many initially employee-owned 
firms have shifted into managerial ownership, but this change takes some time. The coefficient on 
privatization time is also statistically significant between the comparisons of managerial 
ownership and both types of investor ownership--again, earlier privatisation predicts managerial 
ownership. Finally, and consistent with earlier observations, origin dummies are often significant. 
  
VIII Conclusions and Implications 
 In this paper we use rich panel data to examine diverse issues relating to the nature 
and determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes. In many cases our findings 
provide evidence of important regularities and support for several hypotheses. The strongest 
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findings are related to the predictions of risk aversion. Firms owned by insiders are less 
capitalised. This supports the hypothesis that insufficient wealth to invest in equity limits the 
possibilities to establish employee-owned firms, and points out that the unusual circumstances 
created by the privatisation process have helped employees to temporarily overcome this obstacle. 
A second major finding is related to risk. Our results clearly show that employee 
ownership is most durable in less volatile firms. This finding supports similar arguments made 
recently by Blair, Kruse and Blasi (2000), though we have to be careful about the causality (Blair 
et al. argued that employee ownership tends to stabilise firm performance). In addition, we find 
that there are important differences between employee- and managerially-owned firms: 
Managerially-owned firms are associated with significantly higher volatility than employee-owned 
firms, suggesting that managerial control becomes especially valuable in risky firms.  
 Employee ownership is especially transient in new firms. This finding was somewhat 
unexpected. One possible interpretation of this finding is that, in privatised firms, the resistance to 
outsiders is stronger because of a long shared history. Alternatively, the finding may be explained 
by outsiders being more interested in new firms that may have better performance potential. A 
related finding is that employee ownership has survived better in firms that were successors to 
former collective farms. This also helps to explain why employee ownership has remained 
important in agriculture. These firms are probably not very attractive to outsider investors, and 
employee ownership in these firms may be seen as an attempt to save jobs and maintain social 
stability (e.g.. Earle and Estrin, 1996.) 
 Other empirical work on Estonian firms sheds more light on issues of selectivity. 
The survey evidence reported in Kalmi (2003) as well as the case study evidence reported in 
Kalmi and Mygind (2003) points out that Estonian firms invariably apply by-laws that limit the 
group of potential shareholders. As stressed by Aghion and Blanchard (1998), this reduces 
outsider take-overs. The restrictions can be understood as devices for protecting workplace-
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specific rents. On the other hand, outsider-owned firms also place similar restrictions, thus 
preventing potential efficiency-enhancing management-employee buy-outs. These restrictions 
mean that the number of take-overs is smaller than it would be in the absence of restrictions, and 
that the market for enterprise control is not working as efficiently as it otherwise might. 
 There is also evidence concerning the other problem mentioned in section 2, namely 
the tendency for the number of employee-owners to decline over time (Kalmi, 2002, 2003). This is 
also found to be a result of the restrictions on share trading-- it is not possible for outsiders to buy 
shares and new employees face similar difficulties. In contrast, retiring employees often keep their 
shares, or they sell them to the managers. Consequently, we observe less employee ownership, 
fewer employee owners, increased ownership by former employees (which is typically transitory), 
more managerial ownership, and more concentrated ownership. It is difficult to say whether these 
changes in the character of insider owners increases or decreases the likelihood of sell-out to 
outsiders. However, a key finding emerging from this research is that it is often the inactivity in 
the market for shares – or indeed the absence of any market – more than active trading of shares 
that shapes the ownership relations. Since the process is biased in ways that systematically 
influences outcomes, e.g. by promoting managerial ownership and discouraging employee 
ownership and ownership changes in general, the efficiency implications of ownership changes 
remain somewhat uncertain. For this reason, we now review the results from conventional 
efficiency analysis.  
 In the main the findings from conventional efficiency analysis are consistent with 
findings reported in this paper. Thus previous work that uses a neoclassical growth framework 
shows that, amongst all ownership categories of Estonian firms, foreign-owned firms record the 
highest growth rates (Jones and Mygind, 2000). In addition, based on  productivity analysis within 
a production function framework, Jones and Mygind (2002) find that foreign-owned firms are 
somewhat more productive than are other firms. Manager-owned firms also display better 
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performace than do domestic or employee-owned firms. Finally, Kalmi and Mygind (2003) 
present case study evidence that ownership change from employees to managers speeds up 
restructuring. Consequently, these studies imply that most ownership changes would be expected 
to be towards foreign ownership and to a somewhat lesser extent in the diresction of managerial 
ownership 
At the same time, findings from all of these conventional efficiency studies, 
including both econometric analyses and case studies, do not support the conclusion that rapid 
decline in employee ownership is expected—employee owned firms do not grossly underperform. 
In fact, since the results of conventional analyses find that the differences between insider and 
outsider ownership are not pronounced, one might  expect that enterprise ownership would  remain 
rather stable. To the extent that ownership switches do occur, changes in favour of outsider 
ownership might be anticipated, because of the problems of risk aversion and liquidity that 
insiders face. Again, these predictions are not fully born out by the data. Most obviously, there are 
few changes to foreign ownership, despite its promise of fast growth and good performance. 
However, it is possible that foreigners increase their ownership by setting up new startups, rather 
than by entering into time-consuming and difficult bargaining processes with incumbent owners. 
Our data do not capture this possibility well. On the other hand, we find that managers are 
increasing their ownership stakes, and perhaps are doing so to even greater extents than pure 
efficiency considerations would warrant. No doubt their informational advantages and hierarchical 
positions over employees helps managers to increase their ownership stakes. Perhaps the most 
surprising finding is that the changes from outsider to insider ownership outnumber the changes 
from insider to outsider ownership (although the difference is not large) and this is mainly due to 
the prevalence of managerial take-overs. 
In sum the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the view that efficiency 
considerations drive ownership changes, but we also recognise that there are other important 
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influences as well. In future work that seeks to identify the varying importance of efficiency and 
non-efficiency considerations we see scope for different types of analysis, including conventional 
efficiency analysis, the analysis of ownership changes and survival analysis. In this future work it 
will be important to try to capture the impact of ownership changes alongside conventional 
determinants of efficiency. 28 
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APPENDIX 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
 
EMPLOY93 (98) Average number of employees in 1993 (1998) 
LNEMPLOY93 (98) Natural logarithm of average number of employees in 1993 
(98) 
PRODUCTIV93 (98) Sales per employee in 1993 (98) in 1000 EEK 
LNPRODUCTIV93 (98) Natural logarithm of sales per employee in 1993 (98) in 
EEK 
CAPINTENS93 (98) Fixed assets per employee in 1993 (98), in 1000 EEK  
LNCAPINTENS93 (98) Natural logarithm of fixed assets per employee in 1993 
(98), in EEK 
EQEMPL94 (98) Nominal share capital per employee in 1994 (98), in 1000 
EEK 
LNEQEMPL94 (98)  Natural logarithm of nominal share capital per employee in 
1994 (98), in EEK 
PROFITMARGIN93  Net profits per unit of sales in 1993 
CITY Dummy variable, takes value 1 if firm located in one of the 
5 biggest Estonian cities (Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, Kohtla-
Järve and Pärnu), 0 otherwise 
AGRI The firm is operating in agriculture 
MANU The firm is operating in manufacturing 
STATEOWN Dummy variable, takes value 1 if the firm is formerly state-
owned, 0 otherwise 
NEW Dummy variable, takes value 1 if the firm is new, 0 
otherwise 
TIMEPRIV Time of privatisation where 1988=1, 1989=2,… 1994=7.  
SALESGROWTH Annual growth rate of real sales. Sales are deflated by 
using the EBRD consumer price index for Estonia. 
INVESTMENT Annual growth rate of real fixed capital. The capital stock 
is deflated by using the EBRD consumer price index for 
Estonia. 
EMPLOYGROWTH Annual growth rate of employment.  
PRODGROWTH Annual growth rate of real sales per employee. Sales are 
deflated by using the EBRD consumer price index for 
Estonia. 
CAPINTGROWTH Annual growth rate of real fixed assets per employee. The 
capital stock is deflated by using the EBRD consumer price 
index for Estonia. 
AVERPROF Average of annual real profits per unit of sales. Both 
profits and sales are deflated by using the EBRD consumer 
price index for Estonia. 
INS95 (for firms initially in outsider 
ownership) 
The percentage of minority insider ownership in 1995 
MANAGER Firm in dominant managerial ownership in 1995 
FOREIGN Firm in dominant foreign ownership in 1995 
VARSALE1 Natural logarithm of variance of real sales. Sales are 
deflated by using the EBRD consumer price index for 
Estonia. 
SALESVOLA2 Variation coefficient of sales (standard deviation to 
average sales) 
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TABLE 1. ORIGIN AND OWNERSHIP CATEGORY AT THE TIME OF PRIVATISATION.  
 
 Former state 
firms 
Former 
collectives 
Former joint 
ventures 
New firms Total 
Foreign 9 1 30 48 88 
Domestic 
outsiders 
33 46 3 34 116 
Managers 26 4 0 58 88 
Employees 38 16 0 18 72 
Total 106 67 33 158 364 
Source: For this and all other tables, the database of Estonian enterprises at CEES, Copenhagen Business School. 
Note: This table includes firms that were private at the beginning of 1995. 
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 TABLE 2. TRANSITION MATRIX: OWNERSHIP CHANGES BETWEEN 1995 AND 1999  
Dominant owners in January 1st 1995 (rows)/ Dominant owners in 1999 (columns) 
 
 Foreign
ers 99 
Domestic 
investors 99 
Managers 
99 
Employees 
99 
Former 
employees 
99 
Total 95 
Foreigners 95 50 3 7 0 0 60 
Domestic 
investors 95 
4 53 12 4 3 76 
Managers 95 1 5 54 1 4 65 
Employees 95 5 9 13 12 7 46 
Former 
employees 95 
0 1 1 2 1 5 
Total 99 60 71 87 19 15 252 
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS: VARIABLES USED IN INITIAL OWNERSHIP 
ANALYSIS: MEANS (Standard Deviations).  
 
 All 
N=364 1 
Foreign-
owned 
N=89  
Domestic-
owned 
N=121 
Manager-
owned 
N=90 
Employee-
owned 
N=55  
Owned by 
former 
employees 
N=9 
EMPLOY93 111.555 
(176.525) 
64.562 
(114.413) 
149.273 
(186.451) 
69.556 
(129.177) 
174.927 
(260.472) 
101.889 
(106.001) 
PRODUCTIV93 216.862 
(661.374) 
616.764 
(1239.16) 
89.509 
(92.790) 
103.393 
(173.174) 
56.531 
(45.288) 
56.994 
(54.642) 
CAPINTENS93 59.529 
(159.683) 
144.405 
(270.541) 
43.068 
(84.258) 
28.511 
(100.973) 
12.047 
(11.181) 
17.200 
(21.772) 
EQEMPL93 74.415 
(571.647) 
291.498 
(1234.20) 
33.671 
(68.789) 
4.804 
(8.076) 
4.920 
(8.140) 
6.338 
(8.142) 
PROFITMARGIN
93 
0.0095 
(0.154) 
-0.025 
(0.227) 
0.016 
(0.143) 
0.0047 
(0.104) 
0.054 
(0.086) 
0.035 
(0.071) 
CITY 0.563 
(0.497) 
0.719 
(0.452) 
0.537 
(0.501) 
0.533 
(0.502) 
0.455 
(0.503) 
0.333 
(0.500) 
AGRI 0.225 
(0.418) 
0.101 
(0.303) 
0.339 
(0.475) 
0.156 
(0.364) 
0.309 
(0.466) 
0.111 
(0.333) 
MANU 0.354 
(0.479) 
0.360 
(0.483) 
0.355 
(0.481) 
0.333 
(0.474) 
0.364 
(0.485) 
0.444 
(0.527) 
STATEOWN 0.291 
(0.455) 
0.101 
(0.303) 
0.322 
(0.469) 
0.278 
(0.450) 
0.527 
(0.504) 
0.444 
(0.527) 
NEW 0.434 
(0.496) 
0.562 
(0.499) 
0.240 
(0.429) 
0.678 
(0.470) 
0.255 
(0.440) 
0.444 
(1.236) 
TIMEPRIV 4.624 
(1.291) 
4.674 
(1.116) 
4.835 
(1.374) 
4.167 
(1.318) 
4.855 
(1.177) 
4.444 
(1.236) 
Notes. 
1. Due to missing observations, N varies between 344 and 364. The exception is for TIMEPRIV where N is 206 (i.e. 
only for firms that were privatized and excluding the 158 new firms.) 
2. For definitions of variables, see the Appendix.  
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TABLE 4. DETERMINANTS OF INITIAL OWNERSHIP: BINARY LOGITS 
 Insider ownership (N): 144 
Outsider ownership (N):181 
Marginal effects (in percentage 
points, change from baseline 
probability) 
Intercept 7.806*** 
(1.956) 
Baseline probability for insider 
ownership: 37.1% 
LNEMPLOY93 0.104 
(0.143) 
 
LNPRODUCTIV93 -0.366** 
(0.157) 
-5.7 
LNCAPINTENS93 -0.126 
(0.106) 
 
LNEQEMPL94 -0.322*** 
(0.071) 
-5.0 
PROFITMARGIN93  0.746 
(0.996) 
 
CITY  -0.795** 
(0.310) 
-15.1 
NEW 1.475*** 
(0.416) 
35.0 
STATEOWN 1.332*** 
(0.399) 
32.0 
TIMEPRIV -0.168 
(0.112) 
 
Industry controls Yes  
Lr statistics 107.873*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Pseudo R-square 0.283  
Nr of observations 325  
 
Notes:  
1. Significance levels: *- 10% level of significance; ** - 5% level of significance; *** - 1% level of significance.  
2. Marginal effects were calculated for the following changes: For the underlying continuous (non-logarithmic) 
variables, 100 % increase. For dummy variables, unit increase. Calculations are reported only for statistically 
significant coefficients. 
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TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: MULTINOMIAL LOGITS 
 
 Employees vs. 
Foreign 
Employees vs. domestic 
outsiders 
Employees vs. 
managers 
Foreign vs. 
managers 
Domestic investors 
vs. managers 
Intercept 18.788*** 
(3.499) 
 
4.582* 
(2.518) 
 
1.370 
(2.730) 
 
-16.705*** 
(3.24) 
 
-2.300 
(2.456) 
LNEMPLOY93 0.557** 
(0.236) 
 
0.148 
(0.184) 
 
0.451** 
(0.209) 
 
-0.159 
(0.219) 
 
0.243 
(0.185) 
 
LNPRODUCTIV93 -1.000*** 
(0.267) 
) 
-0.395* 
(0.224) 
 
-0.347 
(0.234) 
 
0.639*** 
(0.223) 
 
0.021 
(0.203) 
 
LNCAPINTENS93 -0.376** 
(0.184) 
 
0.068 
(0.145) 
 
0.088 
(0.145) 
 
0.457*** 
(0.158) 
 
0.0181 
(0.130) 
LNEQEMPL94 -0.460*** 
(0.123) 
 
-0.289*** 
(0.099) 
 
-0.032 
(0.104) 
 
0.403*** 
(0.106) 
 
0.222** 
(0.091) 
 
PROFITMARGIN93 5.561*** 
(1.694) 
 
3.983** 
(1.621) 
 
5.163*** 
(1.713) 
 
-0.531 
(1.270) 
 
1.082 
(1.265) 
 
CITY -1.088** 
(0.511) 
 
-0.867** 
(0.403) 
 
-0.274 
(0.422) 
 
0.843 
(0.459) 
 
0.637* 
(0.384) 
 
STATEOWN 0.503 
(0.669) 
 
1.130** 
(0.452) 
 
-0.937 
(0.673) 
 
-1.543** 
(0.777) 
 
-2.198*** 
(0.620) 
 
NEW -0.992 
(0.680) 
 
1.004* 
(0.532) 
 
-1.802*** 
(0.697) 
 
-0.875 
(0.740) 
 
-2.919*** 
(0.628) 
 
TIMEPRIV -0.289 
(0.194) 
 
-0.015 
(0.143) 
 
0.137 
(0.159) 
 
0.398** 
(0.178) 
 
0.123 
(0.140) 
 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 
1. Significance levels: *- 10% level of significance; ** - 5% level of significance; *** - 1% level of significance.  
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 TABLE 6. OWNERSHIP CHANGES BY YEAR 
 Initial insider ownership Initial outsider ownership 
No change 88 95 
Change in year Insider -> outsider ownership Outsider -> insider ownership 
1998 8 8 
1997 4 4 
1996 8 8 
1995 1 6 
Changes/total 21/109 
(19.3%) 
26/121 
(21.5%) 
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TABLE 7 SUMMARY STATISTICS: ADDITIONAL VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF 
OWNERSHIP CHANGES 
 
 Foreign Domestic 
outsiders 
Managers Employees and former 
employees 
SALESGROWTH 0.188 
(0.558) 
0.042 
(0.307) 
0.039 
(0.218) 
-0.035 
(0.187) 
PRODGROWTH 0.039 
(0.317) 
0.153 
(0.318) 
0.053 
(0.194) 
0.074 
(0.196) 
INVESTMENT 
 
0.109 
(0.515) 
0.168 
(0.940) 
0.247 
(0.429) 
0.073 
(0.419) 
CAPINTENSGRO
WTH 
-0.025 
(0.388) 
0.324 
(0.927) 
0.266 
(0.394) 
0.197 
(0.453) 
EMPLOYGROW
TH 
0.167 
(0.398) 
-0.071 
(0.237) 
0.0004 
(0.203) 
-0.096 
(0.126) 
SALESVOLA 0.399 
(0.280) 
0.346 
(0.278) 
0.338 
(0.190) 
0.246 
(0.163) 
AVERPROF -0.012 
(0.469) 
0.015 
(0.239) 
0.032 
(0.073) 
0.035 
(0.102) 
Minority share by 
insiders / outsiders 
0.0614 
(0.140) 
0.137 
(0.178) 
0.0192 
(0.0835) 
0.0102 
(0.0366) 
 
Notes: 
1. Entries are average annual growth rates and their standard deviations except for  profits and sales volatility, which 
are averages for the period. Minority ownership is measured in the beginning of the year of ownership change. 
2. N=230 
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TABLE 8 DETERMINANTS OF OWNERSHIP CHANGES IN INSIDER-OWNED FIRMS, 1995-1999: BINARY 
LOGITS 
 Change from insider to 
outsider ownership 
(21/112) 
Change from insider to 
outsider ownership (21/112) 
Marginal effects 
Intercept -25.517*** 
(9.163) 
 
-25.421*** 
(9.377) 
 
Baseline proability of 
change: 1.5% 
LNEMPLOY93 2.896*** 
(0.892) 
 
2.961*** 
(0.908) 
8.5 
LNPRODUCTIV93 1.765** 
(0.886) 
 
1.882** 
(0.900) 
 
 
LNCAPINTENS93 0.127 
(0.348) 
 
-0.026 
(0.352) 
 
 
LNEQEMPL94 0.088 
(0.202) 
 
0.084 
(0.203) 
 
 
SALESGROWTH -4.317* 
(2.244) 
 
 
-0.5 
PRODGROWTH  -2.536 
(1.846) 
 
 
INVESTMENT -0.754 
(0.989) 
 
  
CAPINTGROWTH  -1.064 
(0.920) 
 
 
EMPLOYGROWTH  -4.207 
(2.994) 
 
 
AVERPROF -1.320 
(3.208) 
 
-1.876 
(3.206) 
 
 
VARSALE -1.066*** 
(0.373) 
 
-1.062*** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.8 
STATEOWN 1.046 
(0.790) 
 
0.839 
(1.165) 
 
 
NEW 3.749*** 
(1.451) 
 
3.691** 
(1.448) 
 
37.2 
MANAGER -1.341* 
(0.707) 
 
-1.341* 
(0.727) 
 
-1.1 
TIMEPRIV 0.411 
(0.296) 
 
0.418 
(0.297) 
 
 
Industry Controls  Yes Yes  
LR statistic 39.126*** 
(0.0002) 
37.826*** 
(0.0006) 
 
Pseudo R-square 0.295 0.287  
Nr of observations 112 112  
Notes: 
1. Significance levels: *- 10% level of significance; ** - 5% level of significance; *** - 1% level of significance.  
2. Marginal effects were calculated as 100% increase for productivity, employment, sales variance and 10 percentage point increase 
for sales growth. They are reported only for  statistically significant coeffcients. 
3. The total number of observations is 112, of which  21 shifted to outsider ownership. 
4. The baseline probability is calculated for an initially employee-owned firm from the collective sector. And all other 
relevant variables are calculated at their sample means. 
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TABLE 9 DETERMINANTS OF OWNERSHIP CHANGES IN OUTSIDER-OWNED FIRMS 
 Change from outsider to 
insider ownership (26/124) 
Change from outsider to 
insider ownership (26/123) 
Marginal effects 
Intercept -2.975 
(5.308) 
 
-4.270 
(5.891) 
 
Baseline probability of 
change: 14.5% 
LNEMPLOY93 -0.022 
(0.444) 
 
0.012 
(0.467) 
 
 
LNPRODUCTIV93 0.584 
(0.471) 
 
0.710 
(0.527) 
) 
 
LNCAPINTENS93 0.590** 
(0.297) 
 
0.577* 
(0.314) 
 
5.8 
LNEQEMPL94 -0.506*** 
(0.166) 
 
-0.483*** 
(0.179) 
 
-3.8 
SALESGROWTH 1.171 
(1.631) 
 
  
PRODGROWTH  2.769 
(2.329) 
 
 
INVESTMENT 0.113 
(0.514) 
 
  
CAPINTGROWTH  -0.127 
(0.616) 
 
 
EMPLOYGROWTH  1.423 
(1.938) 
 
 
AVERPROF 1.023 
(1.882) 
 
0.990 
(1.619) 
 
 
VARSALE -0.396** 
(0.156) 
 
-0.413** 
(0.170) 
 
-3.1 
MINORINS95 0.053*** 
(0.018) 
 
0.053*** 
(0.019) 
 
7.8 
STATEOWN -0.068 
(0.805) 
 
0.027 
(0.817) 
 
 
NEW -0.0041 
(0.888) 
 
0.098 
(0.889) 
 
 
FOREIGN -1.086 
(0.832) 
 
-1.217 
(0.860) 
 
 
TIMEPRIV -0.305 
(0.242) 
 
-0.358 
(0.249) 
 
 
Industry Controls Yes Yes  
LR statistic 46.715*** 
(0.0001) 
48.155*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Pseudo R-square 0.314 0.324  
Nr of observations 124 123  
Notes: 
1. Significance levels: *- 10% level of significance; ** - 5% level of significance; *** - 1% level of significance.  
2. Marginal effects were calculated as 100% increase for productivity, employment, sales variance and 10 percentage point increase  
3.  The total number of observations is 124, 26 of which  shifted from outsider ownership 
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Table 10. Summary statistics for variables used in end-of-period ownership analysis: Means 
(standard deviations) 
Variable All (N=252) Foreign 
(N=60) 
Domestic 
investors 
(N=71) 
Managers 
(N=87) 
Employees 
(N=19) 
Former 
employees 
(N=15) 
EMPLOY98 82.604 
(115.910) 
102.769 
(148.708) 
101.706 
(114.703) 
55.345 
(102.243) 
83.579 
(85.315) 
74.733 
(58.913) 
PRODUCTIV98 195.349 
(357.228) 
430.008 
(660.833) 
139.607 
(174.982) 
136.137 
(122.686) 
68.905 
(56.318) 
95.027 
(66.647) 
CAPINTENS98 123.848 
(565.045) 
112.864 
(161.229) 
292.522 
(1034.980) 
36.144 
(49.036) 
21.786 
(19.098) 
19.147 
(14.064) 
EQEMPL98 135.569 
(860.987) 
165.277 
(525.912) 
323.729 
(1573.152) 
17.327 
(22.350) 
9.278 
(9.673) 
13.748 
(15.429) 
AVERPROFIT 0.0171 
(0.256) 
-0.00753 
(0.439) 
-0.00337 
(0.251) 
0.0315 
(0.0980) 
0.0722 
(0.0510) 
0.0536 
(0.0480) 
SALESVOLA 0.385 
(0.266) 
0.438 
(0.299) 
0.406 
(0.305) 
0.392 
(0.237) 
0.261 
(0.180) 
0.252 
(0.103) 
PRODGROWTH 0.0898 
(0.239) 
0.107 
(0.366) 
0.116 
(0.189) 
0.055 
(0.193) 
0.107 
(0.170) 
0.0811 
(0.122) 
SALESGROWTH 0.0685 
(0.352) 
0.238 
(0.582) 
-0.0132 
(0.258) 
0.0458 
(0.216) 
0.0414 
(0.183) 
-0.0227 
(0.120) 
CAPINTGROWTH 0.185 
(0.440) 
0.0717 
(0.430) 
0.280 
(0.539) 
0.188 
(0.382) 
0.150 
(0.264) 
0.192 
(0.405) 
INVESTMENT 0.139 
(0.418) 
0.185 
(0.527) 
0.0835 
(0.362) 
0.180 
(0.421) 
0.0836 
(0.273) 
0.0745 
(0.355) 
EMPLOYGROWTH -0.0147 
(0.212) 
0.109 
(0.222) 
-0.108 
(0.198) 
0.00111 
(0.205) 
-0.0565 
(0.106) 
-0.900 
(0.113) 
CITY 0.516 
(0.501) 
0.650 
(0.481) 
0.493 
(0.504) 
0.540 
(0.501) 
0.263 
(0.452) 
0.267 
(0.458) 
AGRI  0.234 
(0.424) 
0.183 
(0.390) 
0.268 
(0.446) 
0.161 
(0.370) 
0.474 
(0.513) 
0.400 
(0.507) 
MANU 0.361 
(0.481) 
0.400 
(0.494) 
0.394 
(0.492) 
0.310 
(0.465) 
0.368 
(0.496) 
0.333 
(0.488) 
STATEOWN 0.306 
(0.462) 
0.133 
(0.343) 
0.338 
(0.476) 
0.356 
(0.482) 
0.474 
(0.513) 
0.333 
(0.488) 
NEW 0.409 
(0.493) 
0.550 
(0.502) 
0.239 
(0.430) 
0.563 
(0.499) 
0.0526 
(0.229) 
0.200 
(0.414) 
TIMEPRIV 4.706 
(1.269) 
4.75 
(1.035) 
5.099 
(1.255) 
4.184 
(1.334) 
5.368 
(0.895) 
4.867 
(1.187) 
 
Note: For variable definitions, see the appendix. 
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TABLE 11 DETERMINANTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN 1999: BINARY LOGITS 
 
 IO: 112 
OO: 110 
IO: 112 
OO: 110 
Marginal effects 
Intercept 8.134*** 
(2.766) 
 
9.247*** 
(2.991) 
 
Baseline probability of insider 
ownership: 38.1% 
LNEMPLOY98 -0.163 
(0.209) 
 
-0.290 
(0.227) 
 
 
LNPRODUCTIV98 -0.072 
(0.277) 
 
-0.150 
(0.297) 
 
 
LNCAPINTENS98 0.133 
(0.160) 
 
0.183 
(0.165) 
 
 
LNEQEMPL98 -0.540*** 
(0.138) 
 
-0.560*** 
(0.139) 
 
-8.4 
SALESGROWTH 0.345 
(0.809) 
 
  
PRODGROWTH  -0.132 
(1.119) 
 
 
INVESTMENT 0.164 
(0.113) 
 
  
CAPINTGROWTH  -0.090 
(0.516) 
 
 
EMPLOYGROWTH  2.009* 
(1.150) 
 
 
AVERPROF 0.884 
(1.055) 
 
0.930 
(1.129) 
 
 
VARSALE -0.131 
(0.093) 
 
-0.128 
(0.097) 
 
 
CITY -0.105 
(0.359) 
 
-0.156 
(0.364) 
 
 
STATEOWN 1.158** 
(0.451) 
 
1.341*** 
(0.469) 
 
28.1 
NEW 0.757* 
(0.437) 
 
0.635 
(0.446) 
 
18.6 
TIMEPRIV -0.300** 
(0.133) 
 
-0.297** 
(0.135) 
 
-6.7 
Industry controls  YES YES  
LR statistic 60.893*** 
(0.0001) 
64.484*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Pseudo R-square 0.240 0.252  
Nr of observations 222 222  
Notes: 
 
1. Significance levels: *- 10% level of significance; ** - 5% level of significance; *** - 1% level 
of significance.  
2. Marginal effects are changes in percentage units, when equity capital increases 100%, when 
time of privatisation increases by one year, or when the dummy variables increase by one unit. 
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TABLE 12 DETERMINANTS OF OWNERSHIP IN 1999: MULTINOMIAL LOGITS   
 Employees 
vs. Foreign 
Employees vs. 
Domestic 
outsiders 
Employees vs. 
Managers 
Foreign vs. 
Managers 
Domestic 
investors vs. 
Managers 
Foreigners vs. 
Domestic 
investors 
Intercept 17.965*** 
(6.763) 
 
5.736 
(5.888) 
 
0.902 
(6.049) 
 
-17.064*** 
(4.391) 
 
-4.834 
(3.552) 
 
-12.230*** 
(4.283) 
 
LNEMPLOY98 0.328 
(0.477) 
 
0.083 
(0.434) 
 
0.655 
(0.436) 
 
0.328 
(0.311) 
 
0.572** 
(0.269) 
 
-0.245 
(0.299) 
 
LNPRODUCTIV98 -1.109 
(0.720) 
 
-0.154 
(0.646) 
 
-0.355 
(0.647) 
 
0.754* 
(0.423) 
 
-0.201 
(0.352) 
 
0.955** 
(0.438) 
 
LNCAPINTENS98 0.724* 
(0.424) 
 
0.505 
(0.395) 
 
0.407 
(0.399) 
 
-0.317 
(0.231) 
 
-0.0976 
(0.196) 
 
-0.219 
(0.223) 
 
LNEQEMPL98 -1.064*** 
(0.323) 
 
-0.844*** 
(0.287) 
 
-0.331 
(0.295) 
 
0.734*** 
(0.210) 
 
0.513*** 
(0.170) 
 
0.221 
(0.200) 
 
SALESGROWTH 2.565 
(2.634) 
 
3.939 
(2.617) 
 
2.394 
(2.569) 
 
-0.171 
(1.041) 
 
-1.545 
(1.182) 
 
1.374 
(1.207 
 
INVESTMENT -1.141 
(1.390) 
 
-1.631 
(1.319) 
 
-1.754 
(1.307) 
 
-0.613 
(0.675) 
 
-0.123 
(0.633) 
 
-0.490 
(0.745) 
 
AVERPROF 7.775* 
(3.981) 
 
8.567** 
(3.909) 
 
7.324* 
(3.940) 
 
-0.451 
(1.179) 
 
-1.243 
(1.283) 
 
0.792 
(1.295) 
 
VARSALE -0.517** 
(0.233) 
 
-0.410** 
(0.208) 
 
-0.414** 
(0.206) 
 
0.102 
(0.144) 
 
-0.00416 
(0.114) 
 
0.107 
(0.149) 
 
CITY -0.150 
(0.812) 
 
-0.161 
(0.744) 
 
-0.376 
(0.745) 
 
-0.226 
(0.508) 
 
-0.215 
(0.444) 
 
-0.0109 
(0.499) 
 
STATEOWN 1.176 
(0.882) 
 
1.284* 
(0.741) 
 
-0.660 
(0.811) 
 
-1.835** 
(0.754) 
 
-1.944*** 
(0.608) 
 
0.108 
(0.634) 
 
NEW -2.469* 
(1.318) 
 
-1.412 
(1.258) 
 
-3.487*** 
(1.290) 
 
-1.017 
(0.667) 
 
-2.075*** 
(0.065) 
 
1.057 
(0.560) 
 
TIMEPRIV 0.358 
(0.296) 
 
0.180 
(0.262) 
 
0.701** 
(0.274) 
 
0.344* 
(0.202) 
 
0.521*** 
(0.178) 
 
0.177 
(0.196) 
 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 
1. Significance levels: *- 10% level of significance; ** - 5% level of significance; *** - 1% level of significance.  
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Notes 
1
 While this paper builds on earlier work (in particular, Jones and Mygind, 1999) there are several 
innovations in the present paper that together we believe yield more reliable estimates on issues 
examined in previous work such as the determinants of ownership changes.  For example, some of 
our variables constructed used in this paper were not previously available --especially proxies for 
potentially crucial variables such as risk aversion and wealth constraints. Moreover, in this paper 
we are also able to analyse the impact of important preconditions, such as pre-privatisation origin 
of enterprise, to subsequent ownership development. Also, since there have been additional waves 
of data collection, in this paper we are able to use data for a longer time period than was 
previously available. 
 
2
 This claim can be generalised to include managerial ownership. 
 
3
 Insiders may also prefer to pay out rents as higher wages. Whether insiders are more concerned 
with the level of profits and dividends than wages depends, among other things, on the distribution 
of shares among the workforce. See Nuti (1997). 
 
4
 The undervaluation of shares is often difficult to discern directly, since it is based on private 
information held by the managers.  
 
5
  Even if bank loans were available for buy-outs, bankers are expected to be more likely to give 
credit to outside investors or managers than to employees. The low equity employees can offer 
makes employee-owned firms more risky from a banker’s perspective. See Bowles and Gintis 
(1993) for a formal model.  
 
6
 For the case of Russia see, for example, Jones and Weisskopf (1996). 
 
7
 Not all researchers are convinced by these arguments. For instance Hansmann (1996), while 
admitting that the selection does not work perfectly, maintains that the selection is sufficiently 
unbiased so that the researchers can derive efficiency implications from ownership changes.  
 
8
 For instance, managers possess informational advantages that may favour them in ownership 
processes relative to other employees. 
 
9
 More detailed discussions on Estonian privatisation programmes can be found in Frydman et al. 
(1993) for early privatisation, in Terk (2000) for the centralised privatisation programme, Mygind 
(1997) and Kalmi (2003) for employee ownership, and Mygind (2000) for the entire privatisation 
process. Entry of new firms and small privatisation was also of crucial importance, see Liuhto 
(1996). 
 
10
 In the analysis below, co-operatives that are not owned by their workers (mainly various 
consumer co-operatives and agricultural marketing co-operatives) are classified as being owned by 
outside investors. This is a standard application of the insider-outsider typology whereby all firms 
not owned by their workforces are assigned to the broad and heterogeneous category of outsider 
ownership.  
 
11
 The economic and financial data were provided by the Estonian Statistical Office.  
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12
 While unfortunately, in most cases we cannot distinguish reliably between these two 
possibilities, anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of such cases are non respondents. 
 
13
 This is a dummy variable where, for privatized firms,  1988=1, 1989=2,... and 1994=7. For 
definitions of this and other variables see the list of variable definitions. 
 
14
 Output is here proxied by sales. While value added might be theoretically preferable, it was 
lacking from a considerable number of firms. However, we experimented with using value added 
per employee as a proxy for productivity for a smaller sample, and the results remained essentially 
unchanged. 
 
15
 Of course, this observation does not necessairly hold for start-ups. If a similar difference were 
found in those firms, it would indicate that insider-owned firms operate with lower equity capital. 
 
16
 This finding is also supported in unreported regressions in which we estimate separate 
regressions for firms with different origins. In these the only variable that was consistently 
significant across regressions was equity investment: its coefficient remained negative and 
significant (and large), for state-owned, collective and new firms. These and other unreported 
findings are available upon request from the authors. 
 
17
  CAPINT93 AND EQEMPL93 are also correlated with each other (r=0.49) that makes precise 
estimation of coefficients difficult. However, tests of multicollinearity did not suggest a problem.  
 
18
 Note that data are for 230 firms (of the original sample of 252). For the remaining 22 firms, 
information on crucial variables was missing so that these observations had to be dropped from the 
regressions. 
 
19
 There were a few cases where ownership changed twice, e.g. in 1995 the firm was owned by 
insiders, at some later point by outsiders, and in 1999 again by insiders. In these cases, the firm 
was classified having had no change in ownership. Thus, for all firms that were classified as 
having experienced a change in ownership structure, it was necessary that the ownership group 
was different at the beginning and at the end of the period. Our econometric results are not 
sensitive to re-estimation without including these “double-ownership-switiching” firms. 
 
20
 For instance, if on  January 1st 1995 the firm was owned by insiders and on January 1st 1996 
(and at every subsequent point) owned by outsiders, the annual change was measured between 
1993- 1994. For those firms that remained in the same ownership group (insider or outsider) 
throughout the whole period, the annual change was measured throughout the whole five-year 
period of 1993-1998.  
 
21
 In the main these results are not sensitive to the use of medians rather then means. 
 
22For example, the variable MANAGER is a dummy variable that is assigned the value 1 if the 
firm was classified as being in dominant manager in 1995. The variable VARSALE is the natural 
logarithm of variance in sales, not the coefficient of variation as in table 7.  
 
23
  Somewhat surprisingly, however, change in employment is negatively related to the change in 
ownership (in specification 2). But this effect is not statistically significant. 
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24
 In all cases where outsiders took over the firm there was no previous outsider ownership. Thus 
we were unable to include the minority share held by outsiders in the earlier analysis reported in 
Table 8.
 
25
  Also there is some case study evidence for Estonia in support of this observation.  
 
26
 There was, however, a significant difference between these two concerning sales growth --
employee-owned firms declined less 
 
27
 However this finding may occur because capital intensity (fixed assets per employee) is 
correlated with equity per employee. 
 
 
28
 This would require long panels of data on financial information and ownership. Another 
interesting departure for future research might be to study post-privatisation manager buy-outs. In 
the early literature on transition, the focus was exclusively on changes from insider to outsider 
ownership, or from changes from employee to managerial ownership. While there has been much 
emphasis on manager buy-outs as part of the privatisation process, to our knowledge there have 
not been many studies of the changes from investor ownership to managerial ownership in 
transition economies.  
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